Dispatches
from The Madaraka Express: Five Books
through the African Savannah*
Tinashe
L. Chimedza & Tamuka C. Chirimambowa**
Kenya’s
Long Goodbye to Arap Moi: The African is
Not Blind
In the classic book called ‘Facing Mount Kenya’
written by Jomo Kenyatta, former first president of Kenya and father to Uhuru
Kenyatta, there is an intelligent throwaway line: ‘the African is not blind’.
After almost three decades of authoritarian rule the Kenyans very laboriously
got rid of its big man: Daniel Arap Moi.
Stories are abound of how that political regime tortured its opponents
under Nyayo House right in the middle
of the city and journalists feared for their lives to expose corruption – it
could cost a life. The writer Ngugi Wa Thiongo abandoned his station in a huff
when they came for him with colonial jack-boots, guns to his face abducted him
in his own country. He stayed in detention without trial and his crime was very
simple: his cutting edge literary
explosions were stirring up the hornets’ nest. No tyrant wants uncensored books
in the hands of the masses for they might just decide to take the contents
seriously and who knows how this ends. First, it might be a naked people’s
movement like in Pepetela’s book The
Return of the Water Spirit. But
these demos cannot be trusted. They can get angry very quickly and decide
enough of this nonsense and how about we
get ourselves some ‘big men’ to roast
for a meal. Now that’s a dangerous thought to contemplate even for those behind
fortified houses and behind police and
military cordons; so, better they rough up some writers, bomb some newspapers and send bullets in envelopes.
When everything fails how about appointing the
tyrant’s daughter to a censorship board so as to manufacture a whole unthinking
mass of young people who mistake the mortals for immortals on the evidence of a
mere name. The brother Musaemura Zimunya had to contend with our own Censorship
Board after they banned Dambudzo Marechera’s Black Sunlight. But back to
Kenya. Now the old Moi spends time telling jokes and old musings about politics
and from time to time endorses this or that candidate. Yet he is no longer in
charge and no one from his family are part of any ‘dynasty’ ruling Kenya. The
process was not as easy and as linear as history would have us believe. The absurd spectacle of Moi’s rule was played
out when he banned the secret ballot introduced what was called mlolongo in which voters stood behind
their preferred candidate. Here in Zimbabwe there was a point at which the
ruling elites used a ‘bereka kumusana’
system meaning you had to stand behind your candidate in intra-party elections.
But here is the point: the Kenyans fed up of authoritarian rule, ingrained
corruption, a backward economy and social discontent the first key thing they
did was to have a new democratic constitution and the second leg was to get rid
of Arap Moi. In our case, we already have a new and liberal constitution and
the second leg remains the unfinished business.
Corrupt
elites and Africa’s stubborn enclave economy: Snippets from Nairobi
Down Tom Mboya street, yes that Tom Mboya, the
evidence of the stubborn enclave economy horribly stares one in the face. By
enclave economy we mean an economy in which the modern and urban economy is
very minuscule and is superimposed on an otherwise non-manufacturing and mainly
rural agriculture economy. That economy, typical to Africa, has limited internal
dynamism such as found in a modern advanced capitalist economy which is capable
of generating aggregate demand, sustaining its own investment and capital accumulation.
Here on these dusty streets of downtown Nairobi where rubbish is rarely
collected the competition is very, very rough and stiff to the neck. Man’s
survival mode is in full swing and that primordial instinct to live to the next
day is naked to the eye. The matatu (commuter
buses) conductors are shouting to get the next customer, the pavements are
lined with all sort of wares from clothes, books, shoes and all sort of
consumer goods and each vendor is screaming all sort of marketing seduction to
lure the next customer. This is before nigh falls and the whole economy is
swallowed by bars, music and literally human merchandise on display. The matatus are an artistic form to behold,
during the day loud music blasts out non-stop, the outside has been transformed
with all sort of pictures: from Bob Marley to the faces of Malcolm X, Martin
Luther King Junior and Mandela. Some form of Pan-Africanist crusade pervades
the air. At night, these matatus
become spectacles to behold: neon lights
draping and hugging them with mini-cinemas inside. In the traffic mess the
small motor cycles weave through like those Moto
GP riders carrying one or two people at the back.
This is the daily grind of what has been called
‘Africa’s youth bulge’ trying to eke out a living far away from the elite class
riddled by corrupt networks that feed obese on tenders, government contracts
and dishing out all sorts of bureaucratic favors. To see the horrifying inequalities, one has
to move out of the city a little bit, into the gated estates of Muthaiga,
Kileleshwa, Westgate, Lavington, Kilimani, Karen and then wonder into the new
malls: Two Rivers Mall, Karen Hub and Westgate. Here the elites can shop for
the trinkets found anywhere from London, Brussels to New York. Contrast this
with the slum of Kibera and mass of humans eking out a living in downtown
Nairobi and one gets a sense of how inequality has become a stinging rebuke on
the ‘development’ path that Africa in general is taking, itself as a remnant of
a colonial political economy of exclusion and exploitation. It is this stubborn
political economy which Uhuru Kenyatta & William Ruto are attempting to
assail by building the Madaraka Express –
a railway project whose investment is many times over Zimbabwe’s national
budget. Yet for these projects to start
happening Kenyans had to erode state authoritarianism which had been built by
Moi.
Political
Parties, Kenyan Civil Society and the Electoral Processes
In the words of Dennis Kadima, citing the success
of the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) coalition in 2002, Kenya ‘has become Africa’s
model of how opposition parties can succeed in replacing an entrenched ruling
party and access power by building a vibrant and diverse electoral
coalition’. Denis Kadima’s edited book The Politics of Party Coalitions in Africa (EISA,
2002) is a must read. Since then it
has become common for Kenyan political parties to actively seek coalitions of a
variegated sorts towards major elections and or when faced with referenda. For
the Kenyans to get rid of Moi there
was a new democratic constitution in place; they created a coalition with a new
political identity; the coalition had separate internal structures; had a
policy platform and civil society played a critical role in mobilizing ordinary
citizens. One of the key elements of the Kenyan experience was that the
political parties which formed the electoral alliance were also strategically
complemented indirectly by a very mobilized civil society which was focused on
the entrenchment and sustenance of multi-party democracy.
Fig 1.1 Uhuru Kenyatta & William Ruto: Jubilee Coalition Leaders
As this piece is being
written the two most prominent political protagonists, incumbent Uhuru Kenyatta
and former Prime Minister Raila Odinga, have been actively marshalling some
kind of electoral pacts to secure a win at the ballot box. So even those with state power have been
organising what is called the Jubilee
Coalition led by Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto because they are well
aware that a narrow political project will result in them losing state power.
On the other hand, the opposition led by Raila Odinga has been mobilizing under
what has been called the National Super Alliance (NASA) bringing together
disparate political formations to mount a formidable challenge to Jubilee.
Coalition
Building and Zimbabwe terrain: Some Lessons
There are few observable facts from Kenya’s complex
political terrain. While others have
dismissed Kenya’s, coalition building as ‘tribal’ horse-trading there are some
pointers that can be quickly gleaned. Firstly, all the parties that form a
coalition, be it Jubilee and or National Super Alliance they all make sure that
the political identity of the coalition is above and distinct from those of the
political parties they come from so as to make it very clear that this is a
separate but broader political project than a single political party. Secondly,
the coalitions are complemented by the resources of the existing political
parties but are actually able to have a different organizational structure
which seats above and is supported by the political parties. Thirdly, the
coalition also serves as an important constituency of non-party members, also
attract fence-seaters and in the process, serve as a platform for generating
broader and very nationally popular movement with its own life and
excitement. Fourthly, and very
importantly, a coalition with a distinct political identity complemented by
organic political parties serve to increase pressure on the ruling elites and
might even contribute to further fissures, instability and therefore electoral
weakening of the ruling ‘elite bloc’. In
the case of Zimbabwe one of the ways the party-state has entrenched its
hegemony is a historical sense of ‘comradeship’ created by the liberation
process and cracking this historical solidarity is key to winning state power.
What
Future for Zimbabwe’s Coalition Politics: Some Pointers
In the case of Zimbabwe, firstly even those with
‘superior numbers’, need to rethink a ‘big brother’ attitude which is parochial
and gets bogged into what has been called the ‘big tent’ or as one of theirs
has said: ‘we are the elephant in the zoo’. The big tent points or the ‘zoo
politics’ only speaks to a politics of accommodation and re-arranging the
chairs cosmetically rather than a politics of structural and strategic
confluence which is driven by a clearly spelt out national agenda. Secondly a
genuinely national coalition will have a political identity of its own which
creates new excitement and shows broad leadership from the opposition. Thirdly
the coalition needs structures that will be different and only complemented by
the existing political parties so as to build a nationally legitimate political
organization which focuses its energy on national mobilization. Fourthly, the
coalition needs to start actively building its National Agenda Platform so as
to show its ideas, capacity and drive for alternative leadership. The critical
question here is whether the policy platform is going to be an elite project
written by socially divorced intellectuals or alternatively a national agenda
platform developed by a participatory and therefore organically sound process.
The former process is cheap but the later presents political opportunities of
social mobilization for the opposition to rebuild concrete social and political
power. Recently the MP Priscilla Misihairambwi has warned sternly that ‘so, you
get a sense that as opposition, again you don’t have a group people that have
been able to think beyond the populist nonsensical rally messages’. By building a deliberately broad,
structurally deep coalition which is framed by the confluence on a particular
agenda the opposition formations can look forward to strategic mobilization
which is capable of winning state power and perhaps usher in a Zimbabwe which
has said its goodbyes to the politics of the strong/big man.
*The five books in no particular order: Facing Mount Kenya by Jomo Kenyatta; North of South by Shiva Naipul; I dreamed of Africa by Kuki Gallman; The Africa Challenge by Wangari Maathai
and The Flames of Thika by Elspeth
Huxley.
**Tinashe
L. Chimedza & Tamuka C. Chirimambowa are the Co-Editors of Gravitas.
The Fall of Gambia’s Jammeh and Some Notes for Zimbabwe’s Opposition.
By Blessing Vava*
The Fall and Intransigence of the
Big-man
On the 1st
of December 2016, Yahya Jammeh, the strongman of The Gambia, lost an election
to an unheralded opposition leader, Adamma Barrow, to mark an end to 22 years
of iron fist rule in the tiny West African country.Jammeh's defeat is both
historic and significant, not only for The Gambia but the whole continent.
After celebrating the fall of colonialism and the establishment of the
Organisation of African Unity, the continent has found itself with life
leaders, who have a disregard for democratic principles and maintain a hold on
power in the name of a pan-African and anti-imperialist agenda.Most of the
strong men have been using fear, violence and electoral manipulation, in the
process relegating opposition parties to mere spectators as they continue to
rule using terror. Controversial electoral outcomes have become rituals across
the continent, with regional blocs failing to bring member states to account
and encourage the strongmen to uphold democratic norms and values.In fact, the
continent is overburdened by liberation war cults who consider it their eternal
right to rule at all costs.
Fig 1.2
Strong Man No More: Jammeh of Gambia
Jammeh’s
fall brought a sense of hope for democracy in Africa, despite the unevenness of
the playing field, which was characterised by fear and violence. It shows that
where the opposition gets organised, dictators can still be defeated by a
people united for a cause.Despite earlier pronouncements accepting the outcome,
Jammeh made a summersault, disregarding the electoral outcome to the utter
amusement of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), who stood
firm in cornering the beleaguered dictator to submit and surrender.
ECOWAS Stance on Jammeh: The Dawn for a
New Era?
The
swiftness and the subsequent intervention of ECOWAS as well as the threats to
invade The Gambia to flush out Jammeh should rather be commended and it shows
how much we are progressing to finding solutions to our own challenges as a
continent.Without a doubt, the Gambian scenario was a test for the upcoming 28th summit
of the African Union Head of states to be held in Ethiopia at the end of this
month.Many times, the regional bodies have been condemned in failing to call
errant dictators to order.The shortcomings of the African Union, have resulted
in western intervention by former colonisers, however, compromising the
sovereignty of the African people.As the rest of the continent celebrated the
fall of Jammeh, it was ECOWAS which was rather given a gun salute for their
firm position in safeguarding the will of the people in The Gambia, as
expressed by the 1st of December 2016 election.
Lessons from The Gambia
From this
background, there are a lot of lessons to learn from The Gambia, which can
assist us in understanding the role of SADC in the context of the 2008 or any
other future elections in Zimbabwe.That
election was quite significant in the sense that it was the first time that
President Robert Mugabe was defeated, despite all the State machinery at his
disposal.Now, some quarters are trying to hypothesise The Gambia scenario and
comparing it to Zimbabwe, saying that the regional body, SADC, should have gone
the ECOWAS way after Zanu PF was defeated on March 29, 2008. In my opinion, I
have three points to buttress my argument against such postulations. I would
argue that SADC did all in their capacity, despite the opposition trashing the
regional body left, right and centre for what they deem a failure to intervene
and drive Mugabe out.For starters, it is not and it will never be the business
of SADC or any regional body to undermine processes in member states without
enough justification and, let alone when the participants of the said elections
have failed to win elections. Firstly, March 29, 2008, election was
inconclusive. The votes polled by MDC-T leader Morgan Tsvangirai were not
enough for him to be declared winner and subsequently assume the presidency
from Mugabe. The Constitution was clear on the threshold 50% plus one vote for
a candidate to be declared duly the winner; however, Tsvangirai had just polled
47.9%, therefore, triggering a presidential election run-off.Equally, we must
not forget that it was the same period that the electoral commission withheld
results for five weeks and no-one knows what kept them for that longer period.
Can Regional Bodies Cry More than the
Bereaved?
Those who
still recall will reminisce August 2, 2013, press conference held at Meikles
Hotel by the by then MDC-T secretary-general Tendai Biti, who announced that
the MDC had won the elections hands down. He was later to be arrested and
charged for contravening the electoral act by announcing the ‘results’ of the
elections. Brave chap he was!This brings me to my second point, on how
Tsvangirai shot himself in the foot by encouraging his supporters to remain
patient, as the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) was going to announce the
results. What a wait it became ‑ five weeks.The momentum was lost, and still,
how could SADC intervene in that case?I vividly recall a meeting held one early
Sunday in Harare, were Tsvangirai begged with civil society to be patient with
ZEC.Thirdly, as if that was not enough, the MDC-T leader did the most
unthinkable political gesture; his rushing to seek refuge at the Netherlands Embassy
was a heavy snub on SADC and the rest of the African countries.In essence, he
showed them the middle finger, basically confirming that his party was not
seeking African solutions but those from outside our borders.Hence it would be
naïve to blame SADC for initiating a dialogue to discuss a power-sharing
arrangement to break the political impasse after the sham June elections.In all
fairness, The Gambia scenario is different from the Zimbabwe case in 2008, and
such an example cannot, therefore, be used to point at the inadequacies of SADC
for allegedly protecting Mugabe. Worse still the opposition in Zimbabwe created
conditions that would not have made it possible for SADC to intervene.
History Matters
However,
SADC’s “inadequacies” should be understood from the background of a shared
sense of history rooted in liberation movement solidarity. West Africa has very
differentiated political ruling classes, which do not have very strong links.At
the same time, Mugabe presented somehow of a dilemma to South Africa because he
had “successfully” presided over the fast-track land reform programme a
question that is thorny and emotive in South Africa. In addition, in West
Africa, the “colonial masters” stayed in the background, unlike in Zimbabwe,
where they were very vocal.Consequently, through the former South African
President Thabo Mbeki papers, the African National Congress was actually
advising Zanu PF, they blocked the release of the judges’ report on electoral
violence.
Boycotting in Whose Interest?
Ultimately,
democracy, democratisation and its consolidation in Africa can never be secured
by the threat of water cannons and bullets, but by the self-organising
initiatives of its people.With the 2018 beckoning, the opposition parties seem
clueless, with some boycotting by-elections, but hoping to participate in the
polls. The Norton, Chimanimani and Bikita by-elections have brought with
us many lessons, and the opposition will pay dearly for that. The biggest
lesson learnt is that by boycotting, they strategically demobilise their own
structures and even the potential voters.How does one boycott a dictator?
Fig 1.3 Tsvangirai:
From No Reform No Elections to Coalition ?
The
opposition only will revel in such pitiful actions to its detriment because a
boycott is a moral statement meant to delegitimise the political class, but in
our contexts the political class knows no shame or morals. Given the
objective to reconfigure the balance of forces, what will a boycott serve or
achieve in altering permanently, the balance of forces in favour of the
political project?For those in the opposition that have contested the
elections, they may have lost, but at least they have had a reality check, and
they may know what to do next time. Losing is equally important and part and
parcel of the electoral process. In the United States, the Democrats got used
to winning and they went to sleep and got Trumped. The talk of
reforms is a far-fetched affair and one wonders how the parties are going to
achieve something they failed to change during their stint in the inclusive
government?
The People: The Final Arbiter.
My advice to
the opposition is that, the solution is the people and they are the last
bastion and natural garrison to defend and expand a democratic sort of politics
which secures their material transformation. Everything else not rooted in
the concrete material reality of our people melts into thin air and the
lecherous political calls will entrench its illicit accumulation project
unchecked.From my own assessment, it seems the opposition in Zimbabwe is
obsessed with mass and power projection tactics such as rallies and streets
protests, yet experiences elsewhere of building a people’s movement indicate
otherwise. Rallies and street protests are only a public display of social and
political power gained, built and galvanised in the everyday lives of people
based on their concrete material demands.
*Blessing Vava is a
Graduate Media Student at the University of the Witswatersrand in South. He can
be contacted at blessingvava@gmail.com
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Forthcoming 2018 Elections: Scenarios,
Coalitions and Some Questions for Zimbabwe’s Opposition Movement.
Dr Toendepi Shonhe*.
1.
Introduction
Given
the history of a parked transition since 1980, Zimbabweans are worried that the
country remains arrested by retrogression. Zimbabwe has been stagnant without
tangible development and the future of the country is threatened by
mis-governance, corruption, lack of leadership and a complete absence of a
shared vision. The country’s prospects are dim. Indeed, the country is in deep
crises that requires Zimbabweans to reflect deeply as a collective. The important
questions to be asked are: why must we be worried; what is at stake and what
are the prospects for Zimbabwe?
Contemporary
public discourse presupposes that there are two variables that are important in
determining what direction the country may take towards 2018 and beyond;
namely, the prospects of a strong coalition and electoral reforms and that the
two are mutually exclusive. The truth of
the matter is that while these two factors are critical, there are other
equally important factors to consider when trying to imagine what sort of
strategies the opposition in Zimbabwe may assume going into 2018. This article
provides an opportunity to technically appraise these complex electoral
questions and the prospects for the opposition.
2.
Key Factors for Scenario Mapping
As already indicated,
beyond coalitions and electoral reforms, the other factors to be considered are;
the economy, regional and international support, legitimacy, leadership,
funding, trust and confidence.
2.1.
The Economy
A
further deterioration of the economy will result in increased dissatisfaction
by the citizens. In any case, unemployment and the economic crises remain the
major concern by citizens across the width and breath of the country, as the
May 2017 Afrobarometer results have shown. The high prevalence of poverty in
both urban and rural areas, among the young and women is a key factor for the citizens.
Against limited scope for reversal of the downward trend in the economy, given
the unlikelihood of increasing Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), slowed down
impact of the import substitution policy implemented through SI 64 and limited
value addition on minerals and agricultural commodities, the chances of
stabilizing the currency remains sketchy. However, cognisance must be taken of
possibilities of food security gained in the 2016/17 farming season and its
potential to minimize the levels of disenchantment. Food sovereignty will have
the effect of reducing the demand for foreign currency and as such may help
stabilize the currency. If this was to trigger production in the industry, this
may begin to reverse de-industrialisation; however, this looks most unlikely as
most products are exported in raw form due to the disarticulated nature of the
economy. In the absence of fundamental changes in industrial production little
must be expected to revamp the economy .
Fig
1.4 VP Mnagangwa leading Command Economy: Election Gimmick?
Interestingly,
apportioning blame and giving accolades by citizens has not matched
conventional knowledge, as the May 2017 Afrobarometer revealed. On the other
hand, Zanu PF has sought to proffer a new narrative based on an emerging new
economy where the informality of the economy is normalized. This has been aided
by a highly reconfigured political economy where the social base has undergone
comprehensive changes. How the ruling
party will consolidate its narrative and/or how the opposition will develop and
indulge with a counter-narrative matters in terms of how citizens will weigh
the impact of the economy going forward.
2.2.
Regional and International Support
To
achieve the desired electoral and democratic reforms, Zimbabwe needs regional
and international support. In 2013, an opportunity was lost where SADC and the
AU had sided with the citizens’ quest for democratic elections, yet the
opposition disregarded the advice and thereby squandering a grand opportunity
for reforms. This resulted in Zimbabwe regressing in a very significant way.
Restarting
the formula will require a new impetus, which is currently non-existent among
the key players in the polity. This is made worse by the fact that the major
international centers of power, including the country’s former colonial masters
(Britain), the United States of America and European Union have begun to thaw
relations with some elements within Zanu PF, never mind its effect on democracy
in the country. The overall impact is that regional and international support
for reforms will be more difficult to mount given that these players are now
more focused on advancing their economic interests more than settling the
longstanding democratic deficiency, for which the opposition movement has long
cherished.
On
its part, the ruling party has relied on the former liberation movements
platform for collaboration and solidarity. This is likely to increase given the
threat being posed to the African National Congress (ANC) by its own opposition,
now including the core-alliance partners, COSATU and SACP. However, President
Mugabe’s age may begin to cause an overall decline in regional support for the
ruling party. In the event of President Mugabe’s untimely departure, any
successor will struggle to amass the same level of support in Africa,
diminishing the country’s role in shaping the agenda in SADC and AU. How these
possible futures may shape scenarios for 2018 and beyond depends much more on
how either side will shape regional and international advocacy.
2.3. Legitimacy
The
post-2008 elections negotiations that led to the formation of the Government of
National Unity (GNU) revealed that Zanu PF has a strong affinity for some form
electoral legitimacy despite its authoritarian tactics. This may be the only
leverage that the opposition may have to rely on to push for reforms and the
holding of free and fair elections. How the opposition movement will explore
and use this important factor and how Zanu PF will respond may have material
impact on the quality of the election to be held in 2018? Alternatively, it
will be a question of how Zanu PF ensure that they secure legitimacy in spite
of their refusal to implement electoral reforms? These questions will
determine how Zimbabwe’s future may be
shaped going into 2018 and beyond.
2.4. Leadership
A
key factor that will influence likely scenarios for 2018 is leadership. With
regards to Zanu PF, providing leadership in the various aspects of the
governance sphere, has been problematic and questionable. In the end, the
ruling party has had to rely on the strong-hand tactics to maintain its grip on
power. The party has had to resort to both coercion and consent to secure power
retention. However, President Mugabe’s advanced age, at 94 when the next
election will be held, has intensified the succession battle within the ruling
party. Two main factions (Lacoste and G40) have recently emerged. There has
been intensive infighting that initially resulted in the expulsion of Dr Joice
Teurai Mujuru and her Gamatox team, and more recently the expulsion of some
members of both Lacoste and G40 factions.
What
may serve the ruling party is its strong reliance on security apparatus for
electoral campaigns. For instance, its continued presence in the villages under
Maguta, the securitisation of unemployed youth residing in the villages, the
politicization of food distribution, the politicization of artisanal mining and
vending spaces, all work in its favour. As such, in spite of the weaknesses
associated with its aged leadership and the attendant intensification of
succession fights, Zanu PF’s octopus nature and its convoluted party-state
configuration may propel its fighting chances come 2018.
The
opposition is currently fragmented. There are as more than 40 political
parties, even though some of them have been described as brief-case parties.
Currently, there are various initiatives aimed at building a coalition to
increase the potency of the opposition movement in the 2018 elections. However,
the issue of leadership structure remains unclear. As a result, Zimbabweans
continue to doubt the effectiveness of the proposed coalition. In part, the
problems hover around the ability of the leadership to set aside personal
interests, egos and parochial party agendas, and push for a common people’s
agenda. In addition, Zimbabweans worry about the ability of the collective
leadership to build trust and confidence among the voters, given incessant
fights over control, policy, strategies and leadership credentials. How these
and other issues will be resolved is of material importance as 2018 beckons. In
any event, past inadequacies associated with failure to assume state power
after electoral victories will require additional effort by opposition leaders
if the dormant vote is to be triggered into voting.
2.5. Funding
Funding
is an important component for any election. On the part of Zanu PF, there has
been huge inflow of resources in the form of vehicles: buses, trucks and sedan
cars as well as fuel and regalia. This funding is tied to some patronage
setting where international capital has been given lucrative deals by the
government in the mining and fuel industry in return for funding the power
retention agenda. Moreover the party is relying on the printing of bonds and
artificial money transfers for the purchase of hard currency that is in turn
used to purchase electoral campaign arsenal. The stage is set for a highly
competitive race towards 2018. To the contrary, the opposition movement is
underfunded and this is likely to negatively impact on its ability to mobilise
and recruit new members. Similarly, the monitoring of the election will also be
compromised. The civil society is generally resource poor due to donor fatigue
and change of policy, wherein the thawing of relations with the ruling party
has created the need for either genuine neutrality or outright support for some
preferred successor. In some cases, specific funds have been set aside by some
donors to propel some candidates in Zanu PF. How this will be sustained or
curtailed will define the trajectory for 2018 and beyond.
2.6. The
narrative
An
authotarian regime relies on ideological positioning around a revolutionary
project or some historical legacy to awaken emotions among the voting citizens.
As a result, a highly contested area has been around party ideology, policy and
strategies. Some analysts have argued that Zanu PF has no clearly defined
ideology and therefore it is not easy to place their orientation. Yet, despite
their capitalist tendencies, policy pronouncements have almost always been
populist, redistribute and left leaning in nature. The land reform and
indigenization & empowerment programs are cases in point. Meanwhile, the
opposition has shown no clear ideology that speaks to the improvement of
livelihood questions of citizens in general. If this is to change, clear policy
formulation processes must be implemented and this must be supported by
messages to counter the dominant messages by the ruling Zanu PF.
3.
The Two Driving Forces
In
identifying the coalition and electoral reforms as key variables for 2018 among
the other factors articulated in this piece, the opposition correctly captures
the key driving forces for the next election. However, it is the nature of the
coalition and the extent of the electoral reforms maybe central to the likely
outcome for 2018.
3.1. Coalition
The
issue is not about coming up with one coalition for the opposition movement,
but it is about the nature, structure, strength and potential to deliver a
victory in 2018. To achieve this, the coalition must have a people’s agenda,
reconcile ideological differences, establish a winning team, ensure leadership
cohesion, develop a superior message and secure adequate funding. Its
post-election agenda and structure must be clearly defined, taking into account
a possible win or lose in 2018. The coalition must gain the trust and
confidence of the people and must eliminate individual weaknesses of the team
members by assembling a team with differentiated capacities. Overtime the
possibility to achieve these goals is high, however it will require sacrifices
on the part of the variegated leaders from the parties involved, a fit that may
prove insurmountable. Moreover, intra-party frictions may likely balloon as
power dynamics shift in response to coalition reconfigurations.
Fig 1.5 Misihairambwi: Critiqued the Coalition Politics
On
the surface, a coalition that combines groupings from the democratic contingent
and the Mujuru grouping may provide the much-needed gravitas to deliver victory
given the combined elements of democratic values and liberation credentials by
the opposition. The liberation parties are most likely to have created a solid
network within the region where solidarity and electoral support is provided on
the basis of a shared history of anti-colonial struggles in Southern Africa. To
unravel this setting, liberation icons such as those in the Zimbabwe People
First (ZIM-PF) and National People’s Party (NPP) are a crucial component.
However, the challenge remains in unsettled historical questions, where their
past atrocities continue to be a burden which dissuade ordinary citizens from
supporting these formations and may work against the interests of the
coalition. It is also crucial to note that the total support for the coalition
remains below that of Zanu PF, at 32% and 38% respectively. In addition,
support for ZANU PF is way above the combined individual party support of 22%;
being 16% for the MDC T, 4% for NPP and 2% for the rest of the parties. How
these parties in their individual and collective settings will reconfigure
their fortunes is entirely the big question as we progress into the 2018
elections.
3.2. Electoral
reforms
The
electoral reform agenda predates the 2013 elections. Whereas the new
constitution provides for electoral reforms, media reforms and many other
freedoms, its implementation remains a key concern, as citizens are yet to
enjoy these freedoms. Again, whereas the opposition movement has mounted
various campaigns to push for electoral reforms, such efforts are yet to
achieve any meaningful progress. For instance, the NERA platform started with
zest and gusto but this has since fizzled out. Current coalition discussions
have not been specific in terms of how the issue of reforms will be treated or
prioritized, as current efforts seem to be centred on establishing a workable
framework rather than developing the agenda for the envisaged government.
On
its part, the Zanu PF government has never willingly entertained the
constitutional making process. The ruling party resisted the constitution
making process since the early 1990s as part of its power retention agenda, but
had to grudgingly accede to the demands of a highly mobilised and powerful
opposition and civil society. The Government of National Unity (GNU) and 2013
Constitution became the climax of the opposition and civil society in
Zimbabwe. Despite its expansive
consultation and public deliberation, the constitutional making process become
elitist, non-deliberative and served more as a political settlement rather than
fulfilling the interests of the citizens. In addition, the ruling party is
unwilling to implement the new constitution as well as the attendant reforms,
for fear of losing power. It is on this basis that, the prospects for reform
seem unlikely. This may have a large bearing on the prospects of the opposition
in 2018.
The
introduction of the BVR, although advocated for by the opposition has resulted
in a murkier situation given the possible machinations that may disenfranchise
the majority of the opposition supporters.
Put together with the polling station based voting, the opposition
support will likely suffer from intensified fear, and thus accelerate Zanu PF
victory.
4.
Countenancing the scenarios
4.1. Scenario
I: Paradise
The paradise scenario will achieve full
democratic reforms that will promote sustainable elections for Zimbabwe. It is
most highly unlikely, but the best-case scenario for Zimbabwe. Within this
scenario, all the outstanding reforms identified by Crisis Coalition as early
as 2003 and recently restated by Dr Ibbo Mandaza & Tony Reeler will be
resolved before the next election. These are;
·
The judiciary has been politicised and subordinated
to the Executive.
·
The bi-partisan parliament still functions as a
rubber-stamp of the Executive’s whims and policies.
·
The army, police and intelligence are clearly partisan
and have played a key role in serious human rights violations.
·
Traditional leaders have been co-opted into ruling
party structures and psyche.
·
Senior civil servants have been manipulated to
serve as handmaids of the system.
·
Religious leadership has either cases identified
itself with ZANU PF policies and positions and has failed to exercise its
prophetic and guardianship role in the nation. Where the leadership has dared
to differ, it has been met with scorn from the highest office in the land
·
Black business is largely an extension of ZANU PF’s
primitive accumulation tendencies in as much as white business was the
sanitized face of Rhodesian fascism.
·
Militarisation of sections of unemployed youths
under the guise of national service programme
·
Public electronic and print media is used as
propaganda machinery for the ruling party.
Mandaza
and Reeler (2016) observe that to level the electoral playing field, the
opposition movement must demand the following as minimum conditions for the
next elections;
·
Demand that all service chiefs make a public
statement to the effect that they will obey the constitution and their enabling
legislation, and will not support any individual political party (as the
constitution requires). Furthermore, they will disband JOC, and only engage the
government through the channel of the National Security Council (as the
constitution requires). Additionally, the government will invite the leader of
the opposition to sit on the NSC as a confidence-building measure, since
Zimbabwe is not in a state of war;
·
Demand that the Council of Chiefs make a public
statement that they too will obey the constitution and their enabling
legislation, and will not support any individual political party;
·
Demand that the state radio and television are de-politicised
through the institution of a new management board, and that this board is
constituted of independent persons without political affiliation;
·
Demand that all the powers under the constitution
are accorded to ZEC, and no government minister can have any say over any
aspect of elections;
·
Demand that the electoral act is amended in order
to allow proportional representation and hence the diaspora vote.
In
addition, in this scenario, all opposition political parties will be included
in a grand
coalition and respectful relationships will be developed. Issues of
leadership, funding, messaging will be dealt with to ignite a new energy in the
opposition movement. A strong and attractive alternative policy framework will
be developed to reverse the negative effects of the current mis-governance.
Prudent leadership in the economic affairs will require taking tough decisions
on the economy.
In
this scenario, the opposition has the brightest chances of performing well.
However, voters seem to be struggling with unanswered questions around the
leadership structure and the shared agenda of the coalition. Addressing these
and creating the necessary cohesion among the leadership may result in
increased combined support from the 32% observed by the Afrobarometer/MPOI
survey to some higher figure given that at least 24% of the population did not
say they sympathize with the ruling party in categorical terms. Citizens are likely to have a new impetus to
vote if they are assured of a reformed electoral environment and a solid
coalition.
This
is a paradox scenario in that it
presupposes the attainment of reforms in the absence of a coalition. This is
difficult to conceive because the reforms can more surely be achieved by a
coalition of opposition than it is by a fragmented opposition. This may be
achieved if one of the political parties or all the political are successful in
working on an electoral reform agenda but fails to agree on an electoral
coalition arrangement. However, is inconceivable that parties agreeing on
electoral reform agenda working arrangement, will fail to agree on a coalition
pact on the same breath. As such, this scenario is unlikely but it is also a
good scenario with prospects for the deepening of democracy in Zimbabwe.
If
this scenario was to prevail, it will create the most ideal environment for
democracy to flourish, because the situation will allow for multiparty
democracy where various parties participate and compete on the basis of their
policies and leadership qualities. This is a far superior proposal in that the
agenda is not confined to the removal of a leader or a political party,
instead; the proposal becomes one that is centered on delivering good
governance and ensuring that citizens can pursue happiness. However, such a
scenario may not deliver regime change, as the ruling party may remain in
power. If there is no drastic change in policy by the ruling party, this may
mean a sustained economic collapse for the foreseeable future.
Scenario III: The dead-end
In
the likely situation, where electoral reforms are not in place and a coalition
fails to materialize, the 2018 elections provides a clear platform for a
dead-end. Zanu PF will achieve a landslide victory over the fragmented
opposition; however, each party will secure a chance to fight on another day.
Those parties that will manage to win some seats will be able to secure state
funding and live to fight from a point of strength in future elections. The
prospects for economic revival under this scenario are very dim. The question
of legitimacy may be the only strategic fallback for the opposition after the
defeat; however, this depends on how regional and international support will be
mobilized and how Zanu PF will respond to the opposition advocacy programs.
This scenario will be made worse by a consequence failure to effectively
fundraise for the election by the fragmented opposition and sustained donor
fatigue. Moreover, going into the election as a fragmented opposition
diminishes the chances to a level where a resounding Zanu PF victory will
impact on prospects for opposition revamp in immediate future elections. This
is a likely but is also the worst-case scenario for the opposition movement in
Zimbabwe.
Scenario IV: Collective Calamity
A
Coalition secured in the absence of reforms is most likely to deliver a fatal
blow to democratic transition in Zimbabwe. The level of electoral faults is so
high that if a coalition was to be achieved and used to contest under the
existing skewed electoral environment, a collective defeat attained will take
decades to reverse. While the current efforts by the opposition is on trying to
secure a workable coalition, its possible failure to secure reforms may pose
the biggest danger to democracy for years to come. This scenario is somewhat
likely but is similarly bad for the opposition movement in Zimbabwe. A
coalition that fails to secure electoral reforms is weak by definition and
intent; it will have weak leadership, poor funding, poor mobilization and
messaging.
5.
Conclusions
Avoiding
the worst-case scenario of the dead-end
and achieving the best-case scenario of paradise
calls for solid leadership within the coalition partners. It also calls for
strategic thinking and planning to avoid identified pitfalls. It is clear that
the skewed playing field has caused fatigue within the opposition support and
may attract voter apathy amongst an increasing number of voters in both rural
and urban areas. It is therefore worthy noticing that in all the scenarios
other than the paradise, Zanu PF is
set to win the election, while a fighting chance requires electoral reform and
the formation of an all-inclusive grand coalition.
This
is likely to deliver a landslide Zanu PF victory for 2018, in spite of
President Robert Mugabe’s old age and what many voters observe to be bad
economic management. Going forward, an inclusive and deliberative approach to
the coalition formation may mean a bottom up approach where civil society and
political parties mobilise from below in order to re-energize the base. The
current situation indicates an elite coalition and reform agenda where the
masses are completely left out. I propose a coalition for an electoral boycott
as the only situation given the slow movement in the reform agenda. At the centre
of the reform agenda should be the untangling of the hold exercised by
traditional leaders on the voters across the countryside.
*Dr
Toendepi Shonhe has a PhD from the University of KwaZulu Natal and is
interested in the political economy of development especially Zimbabwe and Africa’s complex agrarian
relations.
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