The Institute for Public Affairs in
Zimbabwe (IPAZ)
GRAVITAS Dialogue Series Brief No.2/2017
Monday February 2017 Contact: gravitas@ipazim.com
Gravitas
Concept Note:
Economy,
Politics & Fragmentations in Zimbabwe
By Editors, Tamuka. C. Chirimambowa & Tinashe
L. Chimedza.
Zimbabwe
has been gripped by what can be called a ‘political economy of crises’ especially
after the year 2000. The electoral contestations between 2000 and the 2013
General Election have not resolved that deep-seated crisis. This state of
affairs has been summed as ‘defying the winds of change’ (Masunungure, 2009); that
Zimbabwe has become ‘mired in transition’(Masunungure and Shumba, 2012); that
the economy is dominated by ‘extractive illicit accumulation’ (Saunders and
Nyamunda, 2016); and or that the country descended from ‘liberation to
authoritarianism’(Dorman, 2016). Political parties, the labor movement, civil
society, the ‘new’ social movements are all marked by internal fragmentations
which make social and political change seem far-fetched pointing to a serious
impasse which has been referred to as ‘stranded in stasis’ (ICG, 2016). The
dire material consequence of that political of economy of crises, the intense contestations,
contradictions, fragmentations and the ideas of moving out of the
‘stasis’ are the intellectual concern of Gravitas.
Pastor E.
Economy, Politics, State and Ideology:
The Re-Configured Political Economy
In
our view, there are five important processes, amongst others, that are
converging and have had a particular and distinctive
impact on Zimbabwe’s post 2000 political economy. This bulletin will begin a
dialogue around these and other processes which must be interrogated and
responded to adequately especially because any ‘development project’ which aims
at expanding democracy and economic opportunities in any meaningful way faces;
I) Economy – the 1980s economy characterized by state developmental
projects and the 1990s economy dominated
by structural adjustment has all but disappeared and replaced by what has been
called a ‘re-configured’ economy (Raftopoulos, 2014); II) State-Society
relationships – while there was a new Constitution introduced this has barely
eroded the level of party-state repressive tactics so we need to understand how
everyday public power is being exercised; III) Politics & Ideologies – how
is everyday debates and conflict over political ideologies, citizenship and
identities being played out? And with what impact on everyday life; IV)
Gendered Dimensions of the crises – a key characteristic of the political
economy of crises is that women suffer disproportionately and face violence at
alarming levels – what ideas and actions can lead to a society which is gender
violence free and values women liberation?; V) the Global Financial Crisis
(GFC) has thrust back the role of the state into the forefront and questions
are being asked about how much state is enough, reigniting debates on the
‘democratic developmental state’.
Submission of
Articles: Guidelines
The
debates facilitated through Gravitas will be
analyzing and placing new ideas capable of influencing public deliberation and
changing public policy processes to deepen a democratic
politics relevant to people’s daily lives. Articles can be submitted to the
editorial group: gravitas@ipazim.com;
words count must be 1,500 to 2000; articles will be reviewed and edited. Articles must be written simply with a
minimum use of direct quotes, academic theories and aimed at enhancing public
thought leadership. Articles will be publicly available through circulation and
also on the IPAZ website. The bulletin is published by the Institute
for Public Affairs in Zimbabwe (IPAZ).
#Hashtag
movements:
Using
evidence-based data to enhance offline ‘counter-narratives’.
Peter Maregere*
This article seeks to magnify the debate on the use
of social media to build counter-narratives in societies gored by fundamental
political decadence propounded by Tamuka Chirimambowa and Tinashe Chimedza in
their article ‘#ThisFlag and #Tajamuka: Nine
Theses on Democratic Counter- Narratives in Zimbabwe’. There are
three critical challenges that the #hashtag movements need to address in order
to build sustainable social and political change. Firstly, is to interrogate
how these movements as ‘emerging platforms’ could make use of evidence-based
data to augment the counter-narrative. Secondly, how can these movements
practically go into evidence-based advocacy and build movements, relationships
and intercourse with the traditional mainstream civil society. Thirdly, how do
these movements build relationships with institutionalized civil society to
forge either a new type of activism or revive old movements in order to keep
the state accountable while addressing the everyday issues affecting the
ordinary citizen whose voices have been marginalized. These challenges are far beyond the length of
this article, however it is essential to ignite conversations that go beyond
this article in order to fully comprehend the full import of these movements.
#Hashtag movements have become the ‘new normal’ in communication aimed at
sharing, discussing and indeed interrogating critical issues within people’s
governance terrain. Over the past few years Zimbabwe’s political sphere has
witnessed a marked upsurge in social media #hashtags that range from the
comical to discussing political, social and economic questions.
Ruvheneko Facilitating a Panel Discussion
There has been an intense debate on the value of
these movements with others arguing that ‘they are elitist’, that ‘the
revolution will not be tweeted’ and that they are ‘cyber-revolutionaries
obsessed’ with pounding the keyboard.
This sustained criticism has emanated from proponents of conventional
methods of activism and citizen engagement, policymakers, alternative thinkers
and even the orthodox media. Inevitably, hashtag activism will have its critics
and that is, perfectly understandable. ‘Slacktivism’, keyboard warriors,
‘useless exercises in self-esteem’ and more closer home Professor Jonathan
Moyo’s infamous “pastor’s fart in the corridors of power”. Indeed, all sorts of
denigratory lexes are attached to this ‘new’ phenomena totally at cross purposes
with what the new generation understand as explainable ‘clicktivism’. The conventional activists who are
beneficiaries and victims of geography in equal measure are often overly
concerned that the ease of hashtag activism might lead to overuse and public
fatigue. One can almost resonate with that orientation because conventional
activists, over the years, have adopted strategies and accumulated a wide
variety of knowledge and tactics and these may be impossible to “un-know”.
Notwithstanding that these apprehensions may hold true to a certain extent,
global trends on the use and benefits of social media both in business and in
the academia and on the political arena prove otherwise. What was called the
‘Arab spring’ showed important things; that young people were not indifferent
to political, social and economic problems and that when social media was used
as a ‘tool’ it became easier to get them engaged.
Zimbabwe’s
Social Media Boom: Listening to the Data
The growth and development of social media in the
last two decades has become conventional to a point where it is now regarded as
ubiquitous. Statistics demonstrate that in 2016, Facebook had 1.59 billion
monthly users whereas Twitter had more than 500 million tweets sent each day.
That alone in terms of information sharing and decision making is phenomenal!
With this proliferation of easily and quickly accessible social media data, it
would be essential for the Hashtag movements (#Tajamuka, #ThisFlag and so on)
to consider how such data can be harnessed to support robust evidence-based
counter-narratives.
There are rough estimates that Zimbabwe has about 1
million citizens on Facebook and this is populated by a younger demographic and
this cannot be ignored by those desiring social and political change. This
involves a range of considerations, including but not limited to, soliciting or
acquiring that data, creating or strengthening organic linkages with research
institutions and think tanks dotted around the country and designing strategies
for advocacy and end-user consumption. On its Facebook page, #Tajamuka advances
that it is a platform for 14 different political parties, youth assemblies and
44 Civic Society Organizations whose mission is to correct political, social
and economic collapse in Zimbabwe. Certainly, this is a broad constituency and
if one adds ordinary citizens to the mix, then the use and benefits of
evidence-based advocacy is quite apparent. Although a greater percentage of the
messaging advanced by these movements may have been a casualty of ‘emotionalism’
and thus prone to ridicule and oftentimes ‘wished away’ by politicians, it is
incontrovertible therefore that an alternative narrative based on evidence,
reaching out to a diverse audience and thus invariably expanding the geographies
of engagement, may be something worth considering.
Take for example #BlackLivesMatter, in its social
change motivation it became more than a hashtag; it metamorphosed into one of
the biggest movements in recent history. To that end, I think that #ThisFlag &
#Tajamuka and other platforms can take a leaf from this and back up their
messages with empirical data so that they are different from the rubric of
opinions that are rarely backed by evidence.
There is data publicly available on inadequate health budgets, economic
decline, social services collapse, shrinking investment levels in Zimbabwe,
various legal instruments and safety guards to counter the marauding police
excesses on the roads and these movements have to harness this data creatively
to drive their points. That approach, in
my respectful view will present new set of challenges for the regime to just
‘wish away’.
Future
Strategies: Engaging Citizens with Empirical Data
For the avoidance of doubt, I make no grandiose
claims that social media platforms provide the alpha and omega of the ‘new
normal’ in enhancing the counter-narrative that Zimbabweans yearn for. I am not
arguing that these platforms currently lack the strategies to link up and
collaborate with research focused institutions and other bodies so that they
also churn out evidence-based information for them to influence their
constituency and drive social and political change. On the contrary, I believe
that opportunities are available to be taped into, to cross-pollinate their ideas
and approaches with like-minded platforms and institutions in order to
demonstrate the weightiness of their agenda. To continue to rely on
‘spontaneity’ for their actions only serves to affirm the criticism annotated
above. I posit that one of the pillars of certainty is to locate their actions
in evidence-based information. In the ‘post-truth’ world spontaneity couched
with populist rhetoric is a saleable commodity but suffers the ignominy of
sustainability. Despite their array of tactics, the Hashtag movements must
consider broadening their scope into evidence-based advocacy platforms in order
to enhance the national conversation based on an array of issues.
Evidence-based data will inevitably enable the movements to circulate powerful narratives without relying on
mainstream news outlets. Ultimately the idea is to create a conversation to meaningfully
engage with their audience because the more they engage with like-minded
individuals and organizations, the more likely they will be able to build a
counter-narrative that can extend offline. As research, has taught us,
there is a difference between an open mind and an empty head and therefore
approaching the conversation with an open mind notwithstanding prior
dispositions may be helpful. I rest my case.
*Tendai Peter Maregere is a Doctoral
Researcher on Transitional Justice at Coventry University, United Kingdom and
has worked extensively within civil society in Zimbabwe.
Democratic Counter-Narratives: A reply to Tamuka Chirimambowa &
Tinashe Chimedza By Dale
Dore
Social media is certainly a potent tool for
mobilising citizens and building counter narratives to authoritarian
party-state rule. But the new techno-savvy generation of cyber-revolutionaries
forget that social media is only one instrument in a whole tool-box of measures
that have to be integrated into a strategy to wrest power from such an
entrenched regime. While the # citizen-movements must be applauded, their
adherents overstate the power of social media, and underestimate party-state power.
The President has the authority and power to make all appointments to the
Politburo, the Cabinet, military commanders, judges, commissioners,
ambassadors, and directors of every parastatal and every state-owned
enterprise. He has captured the entire network of state institutions and media
whose loyal appointees will do his every bidding. His ruling party enjoys a
super-majority in Parliament and, hence, can change any law or the Constitution
to suit itself. It controls all the means of violence – from the army and
police, to the CIO and party militia – which selectively apply its laws or
simply act outside the law to punish any opposition with impunity. It controls
the entire criminal justice system. ‘Political crimes’ are seldom if ever
reported. If they are reported, state prosecutors and judges will be made well
aware of party-expected outcomes. The party has also captured national
resources, budgetary allocations, and our hard-earned US dollars to oil the
wheels of its vast patronage networks to reward supporters. How do social media
advocates believe they can penetrate such a fortress of power?
Youth Voters: Missing in Action?
The authors say that it is their generation,
the youth, that will vote. But that is not true. If social media-obsessed youths
took some interest in research they would know that voter registration,
controlled by the party-state apparatus, makes it virtually impossible for
urban youth to register to vote. Nearly two million potential voters under 30
were not registered in the 2013 elections. These represent a third of total
voters. How can social media address this issue? Then there is the belief that
the public forum of social media can somehow avoid people becoming ‘unwilling
prisoners of geography’ so they can evade police surveillance and state
security harassment. How can the rural population evade the ground realities of
intimidation and violence that induce such a palpable sense of fear? While
ruling party candidates will have free rein to campaign, opposition candidates
will be blocked at every turn. Their members will be denied food and inputs for
their crops, while their livestock, their homes, and their very lives will be
at risk by marauding party militias. How do social media speak to the lived-in
experiences of millions of citizens trapped into being ‘unwilling prisoners of
geography’?
Sally Dura engaging Young women about Voting’ (#She
Votes 2018).
Techsavvy Elites vs Majority Voters
What social media activists fail to grasp is
that they are a small techno-savvy elite who are very different from the vast
majority of voters that are poor, vulnerable and fearful. Social media is a
necessary tool to fight the regime, but not a sufficient one. Yet, the last of
the authors’ nine theses does offer some hope. While they are understandably
disdainful of old-style politics and politicians, as well as NGOs whose donor
funding is dependent on engaging with the regime, the authors seem acutely
aware of the nature of the beast: "ZANU PF has bequeathed to us a viciously
atavistic violent state apparatus which extracts and intimidates; which strikes
terror and indoctrinates; which rots the national moral fibre and corrupts its
young. "This awareness must be translated into the understanding that one
can never accommodate this beguiling monster. It must be systematically
destroyed by deploying every democratic and non-violent means possible –
including social media.
Thinking Ahead: Can the disparate movements inter-course?
The second important aspect of 'Nine' is the
recognition that the old and the new have to work together to build a powerful
counter-narrative and a counter-power to democratise the state. Perhaps the
authors imagine this counter-power to be in the form of social media movements?
But, in truth, power can only be transferred to a legitimate political
organisation – a political party – that can be entrusted with and voted into
power. None of us can do this alone. So now is the time for # movements, NGOs,
and opposition political parties to start identifying a single leader and a
party around which they can construct a narrative, build alliances, and develop
a well-conceived strategy that guarantees free and fair elections in 2018.
Social media will of course be an indispensable ingredient in our fight for
freedom and democracy.
#NB
Dale Dore’s article is reproduced courtesy of Kubatana.
Social
Media and New Social Movements: Five
Point Rejoinder to Dale Dore
Tamuka C. Chirimambowa and Tinashe L. Chimedza*
In responding to the ‘nine theses’ article that we
wrote Dale Dore made some important observations that we largely agree with
especially that the ruling class has constructed a repressive machinery, that social
media is an important tool and that young people are not registered to vote.
See his article in this issue titled ‘Democratic
Counter-Narratives: A reply to Tamuka Chirimambowa & Tinashe Chimedza’.
The article is re-printed here courtesy of Kubatana.
However, in the same article the new social movements are dismissed as appealing
to an ‘elite, tech-savvy obsessive’ few. In this rejoinder we elaborate some
critical points which Dale Dore and other ‘skeptics’ are missing, and we do
that by turning partially to data.
1.Listening
to the Data: Who is really communicating online?
Dale Dore states that social media is a domain for
‘elite, tech-savvy’ people and as such cannot be taken too seriously. We
present below some snippets of important data which reveal that social media
platforms are far more interpenetrated in our social structure than we dare to
admit. The data we use here is available from the Postal and Telecommunications
Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe (POTRAZ) Postal and Telecommunications Sector
Performance Report, second quarter of 2016 and Zimbabwe National Statistics
Agency (ZIMSTAT)/POTRAZ Information and Communication Technology Household
Survey of 2014. Firstly, Zimbabwe’s active mobile phone penetration stands at a
whopping 13 million subscribers and that’s 97% of the population; secondly the
internet subscription stands at 6,7million and that’s 50.1% of the population;
thirdly that same report reveals that 37% of data use in Zimbabwe is now spent
on Whatsapp and Facebook; fourthly, in that same quarter about $167million was
spent on calls, data and internet. Therefore, Zimbabwe’s narrative is different
from most of the African countries where internet penetration is still very
low. These are mind blowing figures which cannot be ignored. The Reserve Bank
of Zimbabwe revealed that Zimbabweans spent a whopping $206million on DSTV,
this is a startling 5% of the budget presented by the Ministry of Finance;
further the RBZ revealed that in 2016, Zimbabweans circulated $1 between 6-7
times online in Zimbabwe, translating to $61.7billion, a figure that is 4 times
more than Zimbabwe’s GDP. This is the canvass of a population moving online
intensively. If internet subscription is 6,7 million and we assume that most of
the internet subscribers are adults that will mean that a significant eligible voter
population is actually online. The over 2 million young people who are not
registered can be reached by social media and not by rallies alone; President
Kenyatta Uhuru’s social media blitzkrieg reached over 250,00 young people in
one day. Let us listen to the data.
2.The Battle for a New Zimbabwe is also a battle of ideas
and ‘new names’
The articulation of ideas nationally is very important and political and social change is
also a battle for the minds beyond the ‘Mugabe must go mantra’. The ruling
class maintains its hold by ‘crude power’ and ‘intellectual ideas’ or ‘coercion
and consent’ (Moore,2008); first by using coercion meaning abusing the state
security apparatus and secondly by ‘manufacturing of consent’ (‘ideas’) which
is why ZANU PF has battled to keep the public media out of the reach. Civil
society in the 1990s and early 2000s built a clear social and economic justice
project that sought to democratize society and expand opportunities for
citizens. Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Union’s “Beyond ESAP” presented
alternative development of ideas and so did the Women’s Charter. Those ideas were communicated by an independent
media and the existing structures of civil society. The bombing of the Daily News and its closure attested to
the impact of the independent media. The question is: what are today’s civil
society ideas? How may these ideas be communicated? How can they mobilize the
citizens beyond the ‘board rooms’ and ‘hotel meetings’? How can Social media be
turned into a potent weapon for developing and projecting national counter-narratives
to that of the ruling elite?
3.The
viral dimension and low cost: Hundreds of ‘Cross Over Rallies’
According to latest
reports Zimbabwe has a Facebook usage of nearly
one million users. Even
if we are to assume that only 25% of these are
active that is a whopping
250,000 people that go on Facebook
everyday. Viral videos, Whatsapp
messages, Facebook forums a
and Instagram reduces the cost of accessing
information independent of the state
machinery. One of Pastor E’s video reached 121,000; one of Advocate Fadzie’s
interview reached 47,000 views; Ruvheneko’s panel with young activists was
viewed more than 17,000 times. This is
almost equal to organizing hundreds of ‘cross over rallies’ only this time this
is done every day and they last less than one hour and citizens can ask
questions and participate. Less people are
buying newspapers, in times of elections ZANU PF ‘ring fences’ the rural areas
and makes sure that access to information is only from one source: the public
media (Herald, ZBC TV and so on). The
idea behind Newzimbabwe.com; Nehandaradio
and SWRadio Africa was the whole
battle for minds which matters. When the MDC and Kubatana ran free phone back programs these were classified as
‘broadcasting’ and immediately banned. The ban indicates that the ruling regime
was aware of the likely impact of leaving MDC and Kubatana running their free
phone back programs.
4.Movement
Building: Projecting a National Agenda, Solidarity and Momentum
Social media helps to articulate a national agenda and makes the political
terrain more fluid meaning citizens can have a feeling of national solidarity and have a sense of a national momentum for
change. In the 1990s the labor movement,
the powerful women’s movement, the radical students’ movements (from which Dale
Dore’s party president came from), the residents’ groups and the constitutional
movement was able to build concrete political power by articulating their
demands and influence nationally through the structures they had. The political
economy is now very informal and industry which has labor movement structures
has been replaced by a vendor economy
in the urban areas and a ‘new farmer’ economy in the rural and former white
farms. Pastor Evan, Advocate Fadzie, Promise Mkwananzi, Maureen Kademaunga and Stan
Zvorwadza are examples of how to mobilize variegated constituencies which in
some cases would never pay attention to a political rally.
5.Breaking
down the ‘borders’: Diaspora Solidarity
One criticism which is very mistaken is that the
‘dominance’ of the diaspora on social media is not a good thing. People in the diaspora raised funds for the detained
during last year’s urban insurrections; the Zimbabwe Vigil has been on for
years, Studio 7 and news sites like Nehanda
and NewZimbabwe have held fort
against state propaganda from the
diaspora. Learning from history, the role played by Radio Zimbabwe and
liberation movements external structures in withering Rhodesian power indicate
the importance of the diaspora. Strategic processes of engaging the diaspora
can be done on Facebook Live, on Livestreaming and so on. Having highlighted
these points, we reassert that the old lenses of seeing must not become what
Philani Zamchiya called ‘unseeing’. There is a reason why Jonathan Moyo is on
Twitter; why the Herald and its
cousin papers are online, on Twitter and on Facebook. The indignation which is
spreading through these hashtag movements is critical. Let us listen to data and stop dismissing these young people as ‘tech-savvy elites’;
they are rebelling and they share the
same indignation which Dale Dore shares: that this ancien regime must be
upended by people power.
*Tamuka Chirimambowa & Tinashe
Chimedza are the Co-Editors of Gravitas.
Of numbers and numbers that
matter, Coalitions and winning coalitions. By Mcdonald Lewanika*
The
Complexity of Coalitions
The surprise success of a Gambian opposition
coalition in unseating the long-term incumbent, Yahya Jammeh, has re-ignited the debate around the
possibility of a grand coalition to defeat ZANU PF in the forthcoming 2018
elections. Evidence from elsewhere in Africa on the merits of opposition
coalitions is abound: Kenya post-2002, Senegal (2000 and 2012), Benin
(2006), Lesotho
(2012 and 2015) to name a few. While these examples provide a
compelling case for a grand coalition, the argument for an opposition coalition
is premised on the 2008 election results, where Morgan Tsvangirai had 47,9% and
Simba Makoni 8% of the vote. Tsvangirai and Makoni’s combined vote would have
bested incumbent Robert Mugabe's 43,2% and also precluded a run-off. Since
then, Mugabe’s longevity has been ascribed to the absence of a united opposition and is increasingly finding space in analysis.
The debates around coalition in Zimbabwe have been mainly pre-occupied on who leads
and the “numbers” that possible coalition partners can bring.
The background conditions that inform the need for a coalition are often
neglected, leading to perceptions of the opposition coalescing as the ultimate solution to overcoming ZANU-PF’s dominance. I disagree with the thinking that an
opposition coalition is the sine qua non
that may lead to ZANU-PF’s demise. The discussions around coalitions do not pay
adequate attention to the fundamental differences in electoral systems,
political practice and culture between Zimbabwe and the cited cases. For
instance, Gambia had a single round presidential election system, Kenya,
Senegal and Benin while having a 2-round presidential election system like
Zimbabwe, have rich traditions of coalition
politics based on ethnicity (Kenya) and ideology (Senegal), while Benin’s 2006
election showed the potential of opposition coalitions. The differences in
electoral systems and political culture should point to some idiosyncratic
challenges in Zimbabwe which opposition coalition talk has so far neglected. Electoral system and political culture are
part of what determines the coordination mechanism for coalitions. This article
addresses the following issues (1.) The possibility that the opposition failed
to win the first round of elections in 2008 because they fielded two
candidates, (2.) the impression that the opposition has enough support to win
an election but is refused access to power by ZANU-PF rigging (3.) composition
of the opposition and (4.) why and under what conditions a coalition might be
helpful in 2018.
Lies,
Damned Lies and Romanticisation of Statistics
The argument that if different parties rally their
supporters behind a single candidate, the total votes will be sufficient to
avoid a runoff or to defeat Zanu PF is respectable, but is steeped in, either,
a romanticisation of the 2008 election or denial of the reality of the 2013
results, or both. The 2013 Harmonised election result, in which the combined
opposition vote (Tsvangirai 34,94%, Ncube 2.68%, Dabengwa 0,74% and Mukwazhe
0.34%) was less than Mugabe’s 61,09%, debunks the coalition logic
spurred by the 2008 elections results.
It should be borne in mind that the 2008 election
occurred during a unique conjuncture characterised by factors like a
dire economic situation, a raging political crisis that had attracted the
intervention of SADC, and deliberate efforts within ZANU-PF to undermine
their Presidential candidate. These factors, which all contributed to Mugabe's
first round defeat in March 2008, although still lingering, may not be replicated
at the same scale in 2018. The simple
arithmetic argument that if Simba Makoni had not contested, Tsvangirai would
have won, maybe misleading. That
argument holds too many factors constant and may be misleading. Changing one
factor from 2008 may have led to changes in other factors. For instance, Simba
Makoni's entry into opposition politics could have introduced a new dynamic and
encouraged some voters who might, in his absence, not have voted for
Tsvangirai, or it could have spurred some reluctant Tsvangirai supporters into
voting fearing the impact of Makoni. Therefore, Makoni’s absence in 2008 may
have led to a total different outcome as it proved in 2013 when his absence
from the Presidential ballot could not stop Tsvangirai’s crushing defeat (warts
and all).
Morgan Tsvangirai marches with ‘nervous reformers’.
The opposition should anchor their plans and
calculus for 2018 on the more recent 2013 election despite reservations around
the integrity of that poll (some of which I highlighted in my book “ we the people” and on my blog in 2013) and alleged vote inflation (e.g. newzimbabwe.com). Roger Southall, Jos Martens, Blessing-Miles Tendi, and Brian Raftopoulos argue that in the 2013 elections, the
opposition failed to understand and take advantage of the changing social base
and political economy in the country. Therefore, it is argued that the
opposition had not done enough to win the 2013 election, and ZANU-PF would have
still won without rigging, a position that is supported by Bratton, Dulani and Masunungure. Despite their claims of a 16%
vote inflation by ZANU PF in the 2013 elections, much higher than 11% fraud
threshold that Gandhi & Przeworski argue to be optimal, statistically, the
removal of the 16% inflation would still not have overturned Mugabe's first
round victory. Based on the above studies, outside a counter evidence, the
opposition may be argued not to have the numbers that they think to have.
Therefore, coalescing runs the danger of being a heap of zeros as claimed by
President Mugabe in his pre-birthday interview and may not help if used as a
singular strategy. This is especially likely considering that the proliferation
of political parties is not based on new constituencies, but is a result from
splits of old parties, thus, dividing old constituents. A corollary of this false diversity is
possible doom for the opposition front, given that some of the parties are products
of political party leaders’ failure to manage internal leadership contests and
dissent. For instance the splits in MDC in 2006, 2014, and subsequent splits of the splinters, like MDC-99 and RDZ, as well as the recent split of Zimbabwe People First are examples of this failure to manage
dissensus and challenges to leadership. So, getting the numbers that matter and
holding together a coalition will have to be more than an aggregation of
existing support bases of extant opposition parties.
All
Players, Great and Small
The discourse on an opposition coalition needs to
be about opposition composition. Some have generally conflated the opposition
with opposition parties. Before 2008, due to the referenced conflation, it was
easy to see opposition as a strategic actor one whose agenda is clear and can
be telegraphed, as a result of associated calculations. However, recent
developments have revealed new dimensions of opposition composition, to include
individual disgruntled citizens like Patson
Dzamara, Evan Mawarire and Advocate
Fadzayi Mahere
as well as citizens’ movements like #Tajamuka, #ThisFlag,
National Vendors Union of Zimbabwe (NAVUZ) and Zimbabwe Yadzoka. These “new” champions have embraced social media
as fighting tool and energized constituencies, primarily the youth (tech savvy
millennials) that orthodox civil society organization’s and opposition parties
had been unable to reach at scale. But this can only be helpful if these groups
are also part of the coalition calculus. The costs of exclusion of this
emerging sector and traditional civil society can be high for opposition
political parties, who while able to put together a coalition of opposition
parties may fail to achieve a wining coalition.
ZANU-PF's failure to resolve its elite contests has
also added complexity to opposition composition, and introduced new actors
(former regime elites like former Vice President Mujuru and her allies at ministerial
level and high party offices, and war veterans) into the oppositional space,
while also possibly altered ZANU-PF's monopoly access to sectors like security. These additions to the ‘opposition'
are a blessing but can also easily turn into a curse. Already, the fissures and
implosions in ZIMPF points to a gravitation towards the curse if not properly
assuaged. Whilst, these developments widen opposition to ZANU-PF, one also
wonders what their impact will be given the chronic failure of opposition
leaders to manage diversity and dissent, amongst themselves, let alone with
former regime sympathizers such as war veterans, former ministers and politburo
members. But growing internal and external opposition to ZANU-PF, may increase
chances of opposition coalition victory as it has been proven that chances of
the opposition succeeding to unseat incumbent regimes are aided by a mixture of
traditional opposition and former government elites colluding. Without
precluding the risk of infiltration, it must be understood that a coalition of
opposition forces is ultimately a product of compromise and accommodation.
The Sum
of the Number is Greater than the Whole
The real value of an opposition alliance ahead of
2018 may not lie essentially in the contrived "numbers" of voters
that parties attest to but in the aggregation of opposition efforts in the
political field. This collection of efforts would assist the opposition in
deploying its limited resources (human, financial, intellectual and material)
in a more efficient fashion that reduces duplication. It may also increase the
number of watchful eyes on the ZANU-PF election manipulation machine. Such
aggregation may also increase the depth and breadth of the persuasive machinery
of the opposition, perhaps reaching some voters for the chosen coalition
candidate who otherwise would not have voted for the chosen candidate outside a
coalition. Eventually, this may bring more actual voters, while also mitigating
opposition parties squabbling over already slim opposition pickings. In the
final analysis, an opposition coalition alone may be necessary but insufficient
to lead the opposition to victory, and a coalition of opposition parties, which
doesn’t take on board broader societal interests, and interest groups in urban
and rural areas may be doomed to fail. Opposition parties can fail to garner
the numbers that matter for defeating ZANU-PF if they do not accede to the
reality that putting together a winning coalition may entail moving beyond the
limited space of political parties to encompass other social and economic
interest groups, in urban and rural areas.
Elections are about numbers, and in competitive
authoritarian regimes like Zimbabwe, numbers that count are those that can
offset the possibility of vote inflation, fraud and ‘margin of terror’. This in
my view is the fundamental task of opposition parties operating either singly
or in a coalition. This is in addition to them putting together a multi-level
strategy that deals with not just mobilisation, but also measures to reduce
rigging, and solid takeover political plans that can translate victory to
power, allowing for a transition to take place in the event of victory.
*McDonald Lewanika is a Doctoral Fellow
in Political Science at the London of School of Economics and is a former
Director of Crisis Coalition.
Notice from Editors.
The next Gravitas will be a Special Issue featuring
past, present and future struggles for gender and democratisation. The
objective is to commemorate International Women’s Day through recasting
contemporary gender questions in Zimbabwe.
The Special Issue will be managed by Guest Editors.
Any articles will be welcome and can be send to gravitas@ipazim.com .
